Le Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative (CIREQ) regroupe des chercheurs dans les domaines de l'économétrie, la théorie économique, la macroéconomie, les marchés financiers et l'économie de l'environnement. The following properties of the core of a one-to-one matching problem are well-known: (i) the core is non-empty (ii) the core is a lattice and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problems. We show that a set of matchings is a stable set of a one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties: (a) the core is a subset of the set (b) the set is a lattice and (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b), and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems. JEL Classi cation: C78, J41, J44.
Introduction
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced the notion of a stable set of a cooperative game. 1 The idea behind a stable set is the following (Myerson, 1991 Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) : suppose the players consider a certain set of allocations of the cooperative game to be the possible outcomes (or proposals) of the game, without knowing which one will be ultimately chosen. Then any stable set of the game is a set of possible outcomes having the following properties: (i) for any allocation in the stable set there does not exist any coalition which prefers a certain other possible (attainable) outcome to this allocation, i.e. no coalition has a credible objection to any stable outcome and (ii) for any allocation outside of the stable set there exists a coalition which prefers a certain other possible (attainable) outcome to this allocation, i.e. any unstable outcome is credibly objected by a coalition through a stable outcome. Conditions (i) and (ii) are robustness conditions of stable sets. (i) is referred to as internal stability of a set and (ii) as external stability of a set. The core of a cooperative game is always internally stable but it may violate external stability.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern believed that stable sets should be the main solution concept for cooperative games in economic environments. Unfortunately, there is no general theory for stable sets. The theory has been prevented from being successful because it is very di cult working with it, which Aumann (1987) explains as follows: \Finding stable sets involves a new tour de force of mathematical reasoning for each game or class of games that is considered. Other than a small number of elementary truisms (e.g. that the core is contained in every stable set), there is no theory, no tools, certainly no algorithms."
These facts helped the core to become the dominant m ulti-valued solution concept of cooperative games. The core of a game is extensively studied and well understood by the literature. This led a number of papers to identify classes of games where the core is the unique stable set of the game (e.g., Shapley (1971) , Peleg (1986a) , Einy, Holzman, Monderer, and Shitovitz (1997) and Biswas, Parthasarathy, and Ravindran (2001) ).
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This paper is the rst study of stable sets in matching markets. In a matching market there are two disjoint s e t s o f a g e n ts, usually called men and women or workers and rms, and we face the problem of matching agents from one side of the market with agents from the other side where each individual has the possibility of remaining unmatched. Matching problems arise in a number of important economic environments such as (entry-level) labor markets, college admissions, or school choice. The literature on two-sided matching problems focuses almost exclusively on the core. 3 However, the core may violate external stability, i . e . there may be matchings outside the core which are not blocked (or objected) by a coalition through a core matching. Those matchings are only blocked through some \hypothetical matching" which d o e s not belong to the core. Once such a matching is proposed it is not clear why it will be replaced by an element in the core. We s h o w that a su cient condition for this is that at the core matching, which is optimal for one side of the market, the agents of that side can gain by reallocating their partners.
Here our purpose is not to investigate when the core is the unique stable set for a matching problem. However, the answer to this question will be a straightforward corollary of our main result. We nd that any stable set shares a number of wellknown and extensively studied properties of the core of a matching problem. Our main result shows that for one-to-one matching problems any stable set is a maximal set satisfying the following properties: (a) the core is a subset of the set (b) the set is a lattice and (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. The converse also holds (i.e. a set is a stable set for a one-to-one matching problem) if a set is the unique maximal set satisfying the properties (a), (b), and (c). The literature on matching studied extensively when the core is a lattice and when the set of unmatched agents is identical. However, there is no such result saying that if a set possesses certain properties, then it coincides with the core. From our main result it is immediate that the core is the unique stable set if and only if it is a maximal set satisfying (b) the set is a lattice and (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for all matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, our main result facilitates considerably the search for stable sets in one-to-one matching problems: we just need to look at maximal sets satisfying (a), (b), and (c) (and if the maximal set is unique, then it is a stable set). We also show that the main result does not extend to many-to-one matching problems.
Two papers in the literature on stable sets contain some similar features as our paper. One is Einy, Holzman, Monderer, and Shitovitz (1996) who study (non-atomic) glove games with a continu u m o f a g e n ts. They show that the core is the unique stable set of any glove game where the mass of agents holding left hand and right h a n d g l o ves is identical. Glove games are a special case of assignment games where there are two disjoint sets of buyers and sellers and each b u y er-seller pair obtains a certain surplus from exchanging the good owned by the seller. Note that their result requires a continu u m o f a g e n ts, an equal mass of sellers and traders, and each seller's good has the same value for all buyers. Our main result does not impose any restriction on the one-to-one matching problem under consideration. The other paper is Einy and Shitovitz (2003) who study neoclassical pure exchange economies with a nite set of agents or with a continuum of agents. They show that the set of symmetric and Pareto-optimal allocations is the unique symmetric stable set. Their result holds in the continuum case without any restriction and in the nite case with the restriction that any endowment i s o wned by an identical number of agents and the agents owning the same endowment have identical preferences. The spirit of their result is similar as ours in the sense of determining properties of stable sets and showing that any s e t satisfying these properties is a stable set. Note, however, that they focus on symmetric stable sets only and for the nite case the result only holds if any e n d o wment i s o wned by an identical numberof agents who have identical preferences. 4 Symmetry is not meaningful in matching problems because no pair of agents is identical.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces one-to-one matching problems. Section 3 de nes stable sets and states some helpful insights. Section 4 contains the main result for one-to-one matching problems. It characterizes stable sets in terms of well-known properties of the core. Section 5 s h o ws that this characterization does not extend to many-to-one matching problems. Section 6 concludes.
2 One-To-One Matching Problems A one-to-one matching problem is a triple (M W R ) where M i s a n i t e set of men, W is a nite set of women, and R is a preference pro le specifying for each man m 2 M a strict preference relation R m over W f mg and for each woman w 2 W a strict preference relation R w over M f wg. Then . We will keep M and W xed and thus, a matching problem is completely described by R. Let R denote the set of all pro les. We will call N = M W the set of agents. Given R m and S W, let R m jS denote the restriction of R m to S. Furthermore, let A(R m ) denote the set of women who are acceptable for man m under R m , i.e. A(R m ) = fw 2 WjwP m mg. Similarly we de ne R w jS (where S M) and A(R w ).
A matching is a function : N ! N satisfying the following properties: (i) for all m 2 M, (m) 2 W f mg (ii) for all w 2 W, (w) 2 M f wg and (iii) for all i 2 N, ( (i)) = i. Let M denote the set of all matchings. We say that an agent i is unmatched at matching if (i) = i. Let U( ) denote the set of agents who are unmatched at . Given a pro le R, a matching is called individually rational if for all i 2 N, (i)R i i and is called Pareto-optimal if there is no matching . We omit the superscript when R is unambiguous and write S and . The core of a matching problem contains all matchings which are not blocked by some coalition. Given a pro le R, l e t C(R) denote the core of R, The core of a matching problem is always non-empty (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the set of unmatched agents is identical for all matchings in the core (McVitie and Wilson, 1970) . We also consider the core where blocking is only allowed by a certain set of coalitions (instead of all coalitions). Given a set of coalitions T , let C T (R) denote the T -core of R (Kalai, Postlewaite, and Roberts, 1979) It is well-known that the core of a matching problem is a complete lattice (Knuth (1976) attributes this result to John Conway). 6 Therefore, the core contains two 5 The core of a one-to-one matching problem is often referred to as the set of stable matchings. In avoiding any confusion with stable sets we will not use this terminology.
6 Many papers study the lattice structure of the core and the set of stable matchings in matching matchings, called the M-optimal matching and the W-optimal matching (the two extremes of the lattice), such that the M-optimal matching is the matching which i s both most preferred by the men and least preferred by t h e w omen in the core (similar for the W-optimal matching). Given a pro le R, let M denote the M-optimal matching and W the W-optimal matching in C(R). Given 
Stable Sets
A set of matchings is a stable set for a matching problem if it satis es the following two robustness conditions: (i) no matching inside the set is dominated by a matching belonging to the set and (ii) any matching outside the set is dominated by a matching belonging to the set. Since the core consists of all undominated matchings, the core is always contained in any stable set. However, the core is not necessarily a stable set. A su cient condition for the core not to bea stable set is that at the M-optimal matching the men can gain by reallocating their partners (and thus, the M-optimal matching is problems see for example, Blair (1988) , Alkan (2001) , Alkan and Gale (2003) , and Echenique and Oviedo (2004b) .
not Pareto-optimal for the men). By symmetry, of course, the parallel result holds for the women and the W-optimal matching. Proposition 1 Let R be a pro le. If there exists an individually rational matching which Pareto dominates for M the M-optimal matching M , then the core of R is not a stable set for R.
Proof. Let The following example is a matching problem where the core is not a stable set even though its M-optimal matching is Pareto-optimal for the men and its W-optimal matching is Pareto-optimal for the women. Hence, the example shows that the reverse conclusion of Proposition 1 is not true, i.e. if the M-optimal matching is Paretooptimal for the men and its W-optimal matching is Pareto-optimal for the women, then the core is a stable set. Note that^ is obtained from W when m 1 and m 3 exchange their assigned women w 1 and w 2 . Then^ = 2 C(R) because (m 2 w 1 ) blocks^ . Note that (m 2 w 1 ) is the only man-woman pair blocking^ . Thus, if there is some 2 C(R) such that ^ , then we must have fm 2 w 1 g^ and (m 2 ) = w 1 . However, this is impossible, i.e. for all 2 C(R) we have (m 2 ) 6 = w 1 . and C(R) is not stable for R even though M is Pareto-optimal for M and W is Pareto-optimal for W. g is the unique stable set for R.
Because of the bilateral structure of one-to-one matching problems the essential blocking coalitions are man-woman pairs and individuals. Therefore, with any set of matchings we may associate the man-woman pairs which are matched by some element belonging to this set and the individuals who are unmatched under some element belonging to this set. Given V M , let
The following is a simple and useful characterization of stable sets (This was already noted by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 
The Main Result
First, we show the following useful insight: if a matching is not dominated by any matching belonging to the core, then the set of unmatched agents is identical for this matching and any matching belonging to the core. Because any stable set contains the core and is internally stable, Proposition 2 implies that the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to a stable set.
Proposition 2 Let R be a pro le and~ 2 MnC(R). If for all 2 C(R), 6 ~ , then the set of unmatched agents is identical for~ and for all matchings in C(R).
Proof. Since the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to C(R), it su ces to show U( ) = U( W ). . Continuing this way w e nd an in nite sequence of men and women which contradicts the niteness of M W. Hence, we have shown that if a man is unmatched at~ , then he is also unmatched at all matchings belonging to C(R). Since the same argumentation is also valid for women, we obtain U( ) U( W ). Continuing this way we nd an in nite sequence of men and women which contradicts the niteness of M W. Hence, we have shown that if a man is unmatched at all matchings belonging to C(R), then he is also unmatched at~ . Since the same argumentation is also valid for women, we obtain U( ) U( W ).
Next we show that if V is a stable set for R, then it is also a stable set for the pro le where all agents in the opposite set become acceptable (without changing any preferences between them) for any agent who is matched under the core and no agent is acceptable for all agents who are unmatched under the core. Therefore, the individual rationality constraint is irrelevant for the matched agents and when investigating stable sets we m a y constrain ourselves to one-to-one matching problems which c o n tain the same number of men and women and any agent ranks all members belonging to the opposite set acceptable.
Proposition 3 Let R be a p r o le, 2 C(R), and V M . Let R be such that (i) for all i 2 U( ), A( R i ) = , (ii) for all m 2 MnU( ), A( R m ) = W and R m jW = R m jW , and (iii) for all w 2 WnU( ), A( R w ) = M and R w jM = R w jM. Then V is a stable set for R if and only if V is a stable set for R.
Proof. (Only if) Let V be a stable set for R. By Theorem 1, it su ces to show
Since V is a stable set for R, we have C(R) V . Thus, by internal stability of V under R and Proposition 2, we have for all Proposition 3 is a strategic equivalence result in the sense that any stable set for a pro le R is also a stable set for the pro le R where all core-unmatched agents rank all partners unacceptable and all core-matched agents rank all possible partners acceptable. This fact also implies that the core of R mu s t b e c o n tained in any stable set for R. 8 Our main result is the following characterization of stable sets.
Theorem 2 Let R be a pro le and V M . Then V is a stable set for R only if V is a maximal set satisfying the following properties:
8 However, the core of R is not necessarily a stable set for R. . If = 2 C( R), then there exists some 6 = S N and 2 M such t h a t R S . Since the matching problem is one-to-one, the essential blocking coalitions are only individuals and man-woman pairs. Thus, we may assume that S is a singleton or a man-woman pair. By the construction of R, there exists a matching^ 2 V such that^ (S) = (S). From the construction of R, then we also have^ R S . This contradicts the internal stability o f V because ^ 2 V and C T (R) = V . Hence, we have C( R) C T (R). We know that C( R) is a lattice. Because the preferences restricted to C( R) are identical under R and R and V = C( R), we have that V is a lattice under R and V satis es (b). Furthermore, the set of unmatched agents is identical for all matchings belonging to C( R). Since V = C( R), V satis es (c).
Second, we show that V is a maximal set satisfying ( (If) Let V be the unique maximal set satisfying (a), (b), and (c). We p r o ve that V is a stable set for R. First, we show that V is internally stable. Let ~ 2 V . By (c), the set of unmatched agents is identical for and~ . Thus, if ~ , t h e n fm wg~ for some man-woman pair (m w), i.e. (m) = w, wP m~ (m) and mP w~ (w). Then similarly as above it follows that _~ is not a matching, a contradiction to V being a lattice.
Second, we show that V is externally stable. Suppose not. Then there is somẽ 2 M n V such that for all 2 V , 6 ~ . By C(R) V , (c) and Proposition 2, the set of unmatched agents is identical for~ and all matchings belonging to V . . By construction, C(R) f g C( R). We know that C( R) is a lattice under R. Furthermore, for all 2 C( R) a n d a l l i 2 N, (i) 2 T (i) f ig. Because the preferences restricted to C( R) are identical under R and R, it follows that C( R) is a lattice for R. By construction, C( R) C(R). Furthermore, the set of unmatched agents is identical for all matchings belonging to C( R). Hence, C( R) is a set of matchings satisfying (a), (b), and (c).
Because M is nite, there exists a maximal set V An important consequence of Theorem 2 is that any stable set contains a matching which is both most preferred by the men and least preferred by the women in the stable set. This is due to the fact that by (b), any stable set is a lattice, i.e. the preferences of men and women are opposed for the matchings belonging to a stable set. Furthermore, the stability of a set implies that the matching, which is most preferred by the men in the stable set, is not Pareto dominated for the men by any individually rational matching. Therefore, this matching is Pareto-optimal for the men if all agents in the opposite set are acceptable for any agent.
Corollary 1 Let R be a pro le. Then any stable set V for R contains a matching w h i c h i s b oth most preferred by the men and least preferred by the women in V , namely _ 2V , and V contains a matching which is both least preferred b y the men and most preferred by the women in V , namely^ 2V .
Note that if V is the unique maximal set satisfying (a), (b), and (c) of Theorem 2, then V is the unique stable set for R. An immediate corollary of our main result is the answer to the question when the core is the unique stable set for a one-to-one matching problem.
Corollary 2 Let R be a pro le. The core C(R) is the unique stable set for R if and only if C(R) is a maximal set satisfying (b) the set is a lattice and (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for all matchings belonging to the set. The following example shows that for the stability of a set V it is not su cient for V to be a maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b), and (c) in Theorem 2. Furthermore, for the stability of a set V it is not necessary for V to bethe unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b), and (c) in Theorem 2. Remark 2 The if-part of Theorem 2 is one of very few results saying that if a set possesses certain properties, then it is a stable set or the core. Characterizations of the core as a solution for all problems have been obtained via properties relating di erent problems. For example, \consistency" plays the important role in the characterizations of the core of Sasaki and Toda (1992) for one-to-one matching problems and of Peleg (1986b) for cooperative games.
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In Theorem 2 all properties apply only to a single problem.
Remark 3 Some literature studies only stable sets which are individually rational.
Then the de nition of stable sets needs to be adjusted by requiring external stability for individually rational matchings only. It can bechecked that Theorem 2 remains unchanged if we restrict ourselves to individually rational matchings.
Many-To-One Matching Problems
It is a typical feature that results for one-to-one matching problems do not extend to many-to-one matching problems. 12 We will show that this also applies to most of our results. Instead of introducing the formal many-to-one matching model we will use the reverse version of the ingenious trick by Gale and Sotomayor (1985) and only consider one-to-one matching problems and associate with it (if possible) a many-to-one matching problem with responsive preferences. For all our examples it su ces to consider the possibility of merging two m e n , s a y m 1 and m 2 , to one agent. Given a one-to-one matching problem (M W R ), we s a y that (M W R ) corresponds to a many-to-one matching problem where m 1 and m 2 are merged to fm 1 m 2 g if (i) R m 1 jW = R m 2 jW and A(R m 1 ) = A(R m 2 ) (the preferences of m 1 and m 2 are identical) and (ii) for all w 2 W, m 1 P w m 2 and there is no v 2 M f wg such that m 1 P w vP w m 2 (each woman ranks m 1 above m 2 and the positions of m 1 and m 2 in the woman's ranking are adjacent to each other). In the corresponding problem, fm 1 m 2 g can be matched with up to two women and their preference R fm 1 m 2 g is responsive to R m 1 over the sets containing fewer than or equal to two women, i.e. for all distinct w w It is easy to see that Theorem 1 remains true for many-to-one matching problems and that in general the following implications hold: (i) V is internally stable in the one-to-one matching problem ) V is internally stable in the corresponding many-toone matching problem and (ii) V is externally stable in the corresponding many-toone matching problem ) V is externally stable in the one-to-one matching problem. However, the reverse directions of these statements are not true in general. There does not need to beany relationship between the stable sets of the one-to-one matching problem and its corresponding many-to-one matching problem, i.e. (i) V is a stable set in the one-to-one matching problem 6 ) V is a stable set in the corresponding many-to-one matching problem and (ii) V is a stable set in the corresponding manyto-one matching problem 6 ) V is a stable set in the one-to-one matching problem. Furthermore, in the corresponding many-to-one matching problem a stable set may not be a lattice and the set of unmatched agents may not be identical for all matchings belonging to a stable set. Thus, Proposition 2 and Theorem 2 do not carry over to many-to-one matching problems. The following example establishes these facts. 
